Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of coalition governance by Matthews, F.
This is a repository copy of Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of 
coalition governance.




Matthews, F. orcid.org/0000-0002-3248-5386 (2019) Formal rules, informal norms and the 
everyday practice of coalition governance. British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 21 (1). pp. 148-168. ISSN 1369-1481 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118808457
© 2018 The Author. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published 
in British Journal of Politics and International Relations. Uploaded in accordance with the 





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
Formal Rules, Informal Norms and the Everyday Practice of Coalition Governance 
 
Manuscript prepared for submission to The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 
 
Dr Felicity Matthews 
Senior Lecturer 
















Despite the significant attention devoted to their birth and death, the day-to-day operation of 
coalition government remains understudied.  This article addresses this lacuna, and sheds light on the 
dynamics of coalition governance by examining the interplay between macro-level institutions, meso-
level values and micro-level practices.  Focusing on the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
that governed the United Kingdom between 2010-15, this analysis reveals the extent to which the 
everyday practice of coalition governance is flexible, contingent, and proceeds through informal 
negotiation and accommodation.  It also draws attention to the dilemmas faced by coalition actors in 
terms of reconciling competing loyalties and appeasing a wide range of audiences.  Through this 
analysis, the article makes an important distinction between the ‘rules-in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ of 
coalition governance, and between the different ways that coalition governance is enacted on the 
‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’.  Together, these findings point to an important new avenue of research 
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The formation of coalition government has been a major concern of comparative scholarship, with 
significant attention devoted to who gets in and who gets what in terms of parties, portfolios and 
policies (for example, Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and Stevenson, 2001).  Similarly, the 
termination of coalition government has been subject to much analysis, as scholars have sought to 
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explain when and why coalitions fall (for example, Laver, 2003; Warwick, 1994, 2012).   However, it 
has been argued that ‘[w]hat happens between coalition formation and termination is still poorly 
understood’ and that ‘the territory remains largely uncharted’ (Müller et al, 2008: 35).  This is a 
significant lacuna, and one that matters for two reasons.  Firstly, across parliamentary democracies 
worldwide, and within western Europe in particular, coalitions are the predominant government type 
(see Müller and Strøm, 2003c; Müller et al, 2008; Andeweg et al, 2011).  Yet despite their prevalence, 
we know relatively little about the everyday practice of coalition governance.  Secondly, and relatedly, 
some have regarded coalition as an outward manifestation of a polity’s capacity for inclusive and 
consensual decision-making (notably Lijphart, 2012, but compare to Matthews, 2018; Matthews and 
Flinders, 2017).  However, for such normative claims to substantiated, a clear understanding of the 
contextual conditions under which coalition governments operate is imperative. 
 
 
This article addresses this gap, and focuses on the everyday practices of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition that held office in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2010-15.  Compared to the 
parliamentary democracies of western Europe, the UK has limited experience of national-level 
coalition, as the structures of Westminster are purposefully calibrated to ‘manufacture’ (Rae, 1967) a 
legislative majority for the plurality winning party.  Yet it is precisely because of this seeming 
disconnect between the principles of majoritarianism and the practice of power-sharing that this case 
should be regarded as ‘critical’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230), providing a unique opportunity to isolate the 
effects (and effectiveness) of formal and informal mechanisms of coalition governance within a polity 
hitherto dominated by single-party majority executives.  As such, this article will make a number of 
broad contributions to the study of coalition governance and specific contributions to the study of 
British government.  Firstly, it responds to the demand for situated analyses of coalition governance 
(Martin and Stephenson, 2001; Müller and Strøm, 2003a; Müller et al, 2008); and by providing critical 
insights from the UK, makes an important empirical contribution to extant comparative scholarship, 
which has largely focused on the ‘consensual’ (Lijphart, 2012) democracies of western Europe (for 
example, Andeweg et al, 2011; Müller and Strøm, 2003c; Müller et al, 2008).  Secondly, it dovetails 
with a burgeoning body of literature that examines how political actors have mediated the ‘dilemmas’ 
arising from clashes between constitutional traditions, institutional rules and governing reality (for 
example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; Marsh and Hall, 2016; Matthews, 2015; Turnbull, 2016).  Thirdly, its 
findings provide further impetus for the emerging scholarly turn towards ‘informal governance’, and 
the focus on the interplay between formal ‘frontstage’ posturing and informal ‘backstage’ 
accommodation in governance transactions (for example, Ayres et al, 2017; Freidman, 1995; Klijn, 
2014).  Fourthly, the article offers a counterpoint to existing studies of British government, which have 
(understandably) largely focused on the dynamics of intra-executive relations (for example, Bevir and 
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Rhodes, 2003; Marsh, 2008; Smith, 1999) and political leadership (for example, Dowding, 2013; Foley, 
1993, 2000; Heffernan, 2003) in the context of single-party majority government. Finally, recognising 
that ‘no act of coalition politics can be understood in isolation from others that may occur earlier or 
later’ (Müller and Strøm, 2003: 5), it provides a timely contribution to the study of British politics in a 
period when such governments are increasingly exceptional. 
 
 
To develop these strands, the article proceeds as follows.  The next section brings together several 
hitherto separate strands of literature to demonstrate the necessity of locating the operation of 
coalition government within its wider institutional context, and develops a critical distinction between 
the ‘rules-in-form’ and ‘rules-in-use’ (Ostrom, 2005) of coalition governance.  Following on from this, 
the case of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition is analysed.  Drawing on a range of primary 
materials, including previously embargoed interviews with actors at the heart of the government, this 
section examines the relevance of formal mechanisms and informal relationships for the everyday 
practices of the Coalition; and in doing so explores the ways in which its members sought to navigate 
the demands of multiparty politics within a highly adversarial majoritarian polity.  The article 
concludes by locating these findings within a series of theoretical debates regarding the relationship 
between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’ governance practices, and identifies a number of areas through 
which this research can be developed.    
 
 
The rules-in-form and rules-in-use of coalition governance 
 
 
Designing the rules-in-form 
 
Whilst significant scholarly attention has been devoted to coalition formation and termination, the 
day-to-day operation of coalition government has been relatively understudied.  Indeed, this ‘stages 
approach’ has been criticised for neglecting the dynamic, cyclical and anticipatory character of 
coalition governance, which requires its participants to ‘anticipate and influence what will happen 
from the time they form their government until the time of their next election’ (Müller et al, 2008: 10-
11; see also Warwick and Druckman, 2006).  As this suggests, coalition governments are required to 
remain alert to the potential for preference divergence, political opportunism and (unforeseen) 
external shocks in order to avoid their untimely demise.  Recognising this, several studies have drawn 
attention to the variety of formal arrangements that coalitions adopt to manage the dispersal of office 




Perhaps the most widely utilised tool is the formal coalition agreement, typically published 
immediately after the conclusion of coalition negotiations (see Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013; 
Müller and Strøm, 2008). Coalition agreements have been variously described as a ‘register of policies 
that coalition parties wish ministers to implement’ (Moury, 2011: 386), a ‘pre-commitment device by 
which the negotiating parties bind themselves to the mast’ (Müller and Strøm, 2008: 165), or quite 
simply the ‘bible’ (DeWinter et al, 2000: 322).  Flowing out of this, coalition agreements have been 
regarded as playing an important role in reconciling ‘the fundamental tension between standing apart 
and sitting together’ (Timmermans, 2006: 264), constituting ‘a basic method for containing ministerial, 
or party, drift in cabinets’ (Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013: 825); and nearly all agreements lay down 
(some of) the intra-coalition rules of the game (although very publicly few deal with the specifics of 
portfolio allocation) (Müller and Strøm, 2008: 175). Coalition agreements are also regarded as good 
indicators of the attention an issue will receive (Moury, 2011; Müller and Strøm, 2008; Walgrave et 
al, 2006).  
 
 
By ‘constraining the actions and policies that can be pursued after the government is formed’ (Strøm 
et al, 2010: 521), coalition agreements thus play an important role in reducing uncertainty.  However, 
they cannot fully resolve the challenge of enforcement, and it is common for coalitions to rely on a 
combination of measures to ‘police the bargain’.  Whilst the risk of agency loss in the process of 
delegation from the cabinet to individual ministers is commonly experienced (see Andeweg, 2000), 
such challenges are more acute in multiparty cabinets as ministers may also hold partisan motivations 
to exploit their office.  Moreover, whilst parties may be able to monitor ‘their’ ministers, they enjoy 
no such control over ministers from other parties (Thies, 2001: 580).  To manage these risks, coalitions 
could establish rules to screen the selection of candidates, for example granting all coalition partners 
veto powers over appointments.  In the real-world of coalition politics, however, such controls are not 
the norm.  As Strøm et al argue ‘given that government office often is the main goal of party leaders 
and their lieutenants, it is not surprising that they do not want to jeopardize such ambitions by 
granting veto rights over cabinet appointments to their coalition partners’ (2010: 521).    
 
 
Instead, evidence suggests that coalitions are more likely to institute monitoring and reporting 
arrangements to oversee policymaking.   One such tool is the so-called ‘watchdog’ (Müller and Strøm, 
2003b) or ‘hostile’ (Thies, 2001) junior minister, whereby parties appoint junior ministers to 
departments headed by ministers from different parties in order to keep tabs on their partners.   The 
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literature suggests that the prevalence of such junior ministers is contingent upon a number of 
institutional and political factors.  Thies (2011), for example, demonstrates that the practice is most 
used in countries with few institutional checks upon ministerial discretion, and is most concentrated 
upon those portfolios deemed salient to the monitoring party.  These findings are echoed by 
Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011), whose research also shows that watchdog junior ministers are more 
likely as the ideological distance between the minister and the coalition increases; and by Falcó-
Gimeno (2014), who demonstrates that when parties’ policy interests overlap, but their programmatic 
positions are tangential, they are more likely to allocate watchdogs. 
 
 
Coalitions can also establish specific bodies for the management of conflicts between the parties, 
which vary in terms of venue and formality.  Müller and Strøm (2003b), for example, distinguish 
between six different arenas (inner cabinets, issue-specific cabinet committees, coalition committees, 
mixed committees of ministers and parliamentary leaders, committees of parliamentary leaders, and 
party summits); and their comparative research identifies the various ways in which such arenas are 
utilised by the coalitions of western Europe.  Elsewhere, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) group 
these arenas according to three categories (those internal to the cabinet, those external, and ‘mixed’); 
and distinguish between those arenas most commonly used, and those which are used for the most 
serious conflicts.  In seeking to explain the different approaches to conflict resolution, their research 
suggests that the existence of a coalition agreement is a key predictor: coalitions that have adopted a 
coalition agreement are more likely to rely on internal arenas, whereas those without one are more 
likely to resort to external arenas to resolve their disputes. 
 
 
In combination, such mechanisms function as an institutional check on the actions of ministers.  At 
the same time, the formal constitutional rules of a polity, such as those regarding votes of confidence 
or the dissolution of the legislature, also structure the wider operating environment of coalition 
governance.  Saalfield (2008), for example, has shown that coalition cabinets are more likely to endure 
if they do not have to survive an investiture vote in the legislature; whereas positive 
parliamentarianism increases the risk of cabinet replacement.  Similarly, Diermeier and Fedderson 
have shown that provisions for votes of confidence are positively associated with coalition cohesion, 
providing an ‘incentive for ruling coalitions to vote together on policy issues that might otherwise split 
them’ (1998: 611).  In contrast, coalitions are more vulnerable to early termination where prime 
ministers enjoy unilateral dissolution powers, which provides heads of government the opportunity 
to cut their electoral losses or exploit favourable external circumstances (Saalfield, 2008: 354).   
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Implementing the rules-in-use 
 
The above studies draw attention to the variety of formal arrangements that are intended to enable 
coalitions to oversee their policy objectives, manage disputes, and insure against early dissolution.  
Yet whilst these studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of the ‘rules-in-form’ that structure 
the inter-election period, we still know relatively little about their relevance to the everyday practice 
of coalition governance.  Indeed, one of the critical insights of neo-institutional scholarship is the 
extent to which the practised ‘rules-in-use’ can diverge from the prescribed ‘rules-in-form’ (see 
Ostrom, 2005).  In some respects, this knowledge gap reflects the main theoretical and 
methodological traditions in the field of coalition studies, in which formal game-theoretic bargaining 
models and large-n quantitative analyses predominate.  Undoubtedly, such approaches have made 
important advances in terms of hypothesis development, data generation, and the identification of 
empirical regularities. Nonetheless, the theoretical parsimony and empirical scale of such studies has 
often precluded a detailed understanding of the interplay between the formal and informal dynamics 
of coalition governance. 
 
 
This gap in our knowledge matters.  Whilst it has been suggested that a polity’s constitutional 
architecture is ‘[e]xogenous to the coalition game in the sense that the actors in this game cannot 
have any realistic hope of changing [it], at least in the short-term’ (Müller and Strøm, 2003a: 4), this 
‘game’ takes place within the long shadows that it casts.  The practice of coalition governance is 
inexorably bound up with the traditions and norms to which this architecture gives rise, and the 
institutional ‘stickiness’ to which Müller and Strøm allude merely underscores this.  It is for such 
reasons that Blondel and Müller-Rommel caution against placing too much weight on formal 
institutional structures, suggesting that coalition governance is the product of the ‘interplay between 
“values” and the “structural instruments”’ (1993: 11). Recognising the stickiness of such ‘exogenous’ 
institutions is not to say, of course, that they are static or impervious to change.  As Thelen has argued, 
the seemingly ‘remarkable resilience of some institutional arrangements’ may serve to obscure 
‘ongoing subtle shifts beneath the surface’ (2002: 101).  Nor does a focus on traditions and norms 
assume that they are unconsciously inherited or unquestioningly maintained.  Indeed, an important 
strand of interpretivist scholarship has argued that traditions are ‘contingent, produced by the actions 
of individuals’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 4, 33); and that the dilemmas which can arise when a ‘new 
idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices’ may force a ‘reconsideration of these existing 
beliefs and associated traditions’ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 36; see also Marsh and Hall, 2016; 
Matthews, 2015; Turnbull, 2016).  Instead, the challenge for those who seek to explain the operation 
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of coalition government is to unpack the relationships that exist between macro-level institutions, 
meso-level values and micro-level practices.  
 
 
To meet this challenge, it is necessary to bring ‘country differences’ (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 
1993: 10) back into the field of study; and to produce ‘thicker’ descriptions that account for how these 
are experienced by those at the heart of coalition government.  In recent years, qualitative case-driven 
research has fallen out of favour, criticised for being empirically rich but theoretically poor: ‘the basic 
features of coalition politics’ being ‘better known than understood’ (Müller and Strøm, 2003c: 559).  
Yet despite such criticisms, case studies have several distinct advantages, particularly in terms of 
understanding political actors as conscious, social beings whose experiences, motives and subjective 
interpretations are an important part of the causal process (Yin, 2003; Bennett and Elman, 2006).  As 
such, case-driven research can illuminate hitherto hidden practices of coalition governance, the 
contingency of traditions and norms, and how the ‘rules-in-form’ are interpreted on the ground.  
Moreover, as well as providing detailed empirical knowledge, the analysis of carefully selected cases 
can offer insights of wider comparative relevance and can contribute to the development of theory 
(see Flyvbjerg, 2006).  In this respect, the case of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition, which 
governed the UK between 2010-15, provides a critical opportunity to disentangle the contingent 




To do so, the follow section deploys two-step research design.   Firstly, to capture the rules-in-form of 
the Coalition’s governance arrangements, the analysis utilises the comparative institutional 
framework developed by Müller and Strøm (2003c).  This organises the formal institutional structures 
of coalition governance into ten separate dimensions, and enables the UK’s experience within to be 
located within a wider comparative context.  Secondly, in order to capture the rules-in-use of the 
Coalition’s governance arrangements, the analysis draws upon the tools of case-driven research to 
examine the extent to which these formal rules mattered for the everyday practices of the Coalition.  
In doing so, it drills down to address a number of inter-connected issues such as the ways in which it 
members sought to reconcile the imperatives of multiparty politics with the norms of majoritarianism, 
the importance of less visible or more informal ‘backstage’ dimensions of coalition governance, and 




Each step rests on the systematic analysis of a wide range of relevant empirical material.  To specify 
the formal dimensions of coalition governance, official materials were examined, including the 
(revised) Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, 2010), The Coalition: Our Programme for Government (HM 
Government, 2010b), the Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform (HM Government, 2010a) and 
the Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office, 2011).  In turn, to identify the frontstage rhetoric of coalition 
governance, ministerial speeches, statements and other relevant government papers were analysed. 
To identify the informal backstage dimensions of coalition governance, it was necessary to look 
beyond such public proclamations.  Face-to-face interviews were carried out with key actors during 
the final 12 months of the Coalition, including ministers, government and opposition backbenchers, 
and civil servants at the heart of the action.  To encourage candour, interviewees were offered 
anonymity.  And interviewees were indeed candid!  As such, interviewees are identified in broad terms 
only (e.g. ‘Conservative minister’, ‘government backbencher’) in order to ensure anonymity.  The 
second stage of the research also drew upon a number of other sources, in particular the Institute for 
Government’s ‘Ministers Reflect’ database, which includes verbatim transcripts of interviews with 
ministers that served under the Coalition (58 ministers in total, 15 of which sat in cabinet).  Other 
sources included relevant select committee reports, along with their accompanying written and oral 
evidence (e.g. HC 396, 2010; HL 130, 2014); the small number of political memoirs that have since 
been published (e.g. Clarke, 2016; Clegg, 2016; Laws, 2016a) and extra-parliamentary sources such as 
leaders’ party conference speeches.  The net result of this research is an analysis of that enables the 
UK’s experience of coalition governance to be situated within the wider comparative context, whilst 
still being attuned to prevailing country ‘differences’.  The next section puts this into effect. 
 
 
Coalition governance on the frontstage and backstage 
  
Adapting the institutional environment 
 
On 11 May 2010, just five days after the inconclusive general election, the Conservatives and the 
Liberal Democrats announced their intention to form the UK’s first executive coalition of the post-war 
period.  Despite the seeming ideological distance between the two parties, their respective leaders, 
David Cameron and Nick Clegg, were optimistic about the prospects of the deal brokered.  Indeed, for 
the new Deputy Prime Minister, this coalition provided the opportunity for ‘a new kind of government’ 
and ‘the new politics I have always believed in: diverse, plural, when politicians of different 
persuasions come together to overcome their differences’, which reflected his longstanding aspiration 
to emulate the coalitions of continental Europe (BBC, 2010).   
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*** Table 1 here*** 
 
 
In practical terms, the realpolitik of governing together within a polity organised around the principles 
of adversarial power-hoarding resulted in the rapid development of mechanisms to manage 
expectations and minimise disputes, as detailed in table 1 above.  Just nine days its formation, the 
Coalition published its coalition agreement, comprising two publicly-available documents.  The first, 
and most substantive, of these set out the Coalition’s policy agenda.  At over 13,000 words in length, 
spanning 31 distinct policy areas, and with over 400 separate policy commitments, The Coalition: Our 
Programme for Government (HM Government, 2010b) can be regarded as a large and comprehensive 
statement of intent (see Müller and Strøm, 2008: 176 for comparative data).  Nonetheless, whilst 
comprehensive, the agreement was incomplete as there were several policy areas for which 
compromise was politically inimical or ideologically impossible; and in relation to these issues, the 
Programme for Government included provisions for the Liberal Democrats to ‘abstain in any vote’, 
‘maintain opposition’ or ‘to make the case for alternatives’.    
 
 
The shorter second document, Coalition Agreement for Stability and Reform (HM Government 2010a), 
delineated a series of ‘expectations’ regarding the composition and functioning of government; its 
policy and legislative programme; support for the government in Parliament; and public 
appointments.  Several of its eighteen rules stood in contrast to comparative experience and 
constitutional precedent.  With regards to ministerial appointments, for example, the proportional 
distribution of cabinet, ministerial and whip positions was entrenched; and the capacity of the Prime 
Minister to make appointments, redesign portfolios or undertake reshuffles was further limited by the 
veto of the Deputy Prime Minister.  Elsewhere, provisions were included to relax collective 
responsibility ‘where it is explicitly set aside’, whilst also allowing for the consideration of ‘any other 
exceptions’ that may later arise.  In turn, the Ministerial Code was revised in 2010 to allow collective 
responsibility to be relaxed in specific instances (Cabinet Office, 2010: 3).  The Coalition Agreement 
for Stability and Reform also set out expectations regarding the application of the party whip on all 
issues in the coalition agreement and on ‘all matters of confidence’.  It was, however, silent on all 
other aspects of parliamentary behavior such as the questioning of ministers or behavior within 
legislative committees.  Whilst neither document entailed provisions for event of a breakdown, such 
as the triggering automatic elections, the Programme for Government did pledge to ‘legislate to make 
provision for fixed-term Parliaments of five years’, subsequently enshrined in the Fixed-terms 
Parliament Act 2011.  This pledge contrasted sharply constitutional precedence, wherein the prime 
minister had previously enjoyed unfettered powers to dissolve Parliament at a time of their choosing.  
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It was, however, one of the Liberal Democrat’s key manifesto commitments (Liberal Democrats, 2010: 
88), and was one of the party’s ‘red lines’ in the coalition negotiations, as it sought to insure itself 
against strategic dissolution and the subsequent risk of electoral misfortune (see Clegg, 2016: 128). 
   
 
To police the coalition bargain, a number of strategies were pursued.  In accordance with the 
provisions of the coalition agreement, ministerial positions were dispersed on a near-proportional 
basis, with the balance tipped slightly in favour of the Liberal Democrats (table 2 below).  Portfolios 
were only allocated after the policy platform was agreed, a ‘sequence’ which Clegg ‘insisted on’ as he 
‘didn’t want to lose leverage over those decisions by getting drawn into early horse trading about 
ministerial posts’ (Clegg, 2016: 30).   However, in terms of portfolio salience (Warwick and Druckman, 
2006) the picture is more equivocal.  Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project shows that the 
issues of education and the environment received significantly more attention in the Liberal 
Democrats’ manifesto when compared to the Conservatives’ manifesto (see Debus, 2011).  However, 
whilst the party won control of the Department for Energy and Climate Change, they were unable to 
secure the education brief.  Moreover, rather than advocating for one of the ‘great offices of state’, 
the Deputy Prime Minister instead chose the Cabinet Office (albeit with responsibility for overseeing 
the Government’s constitutional reform agenda).  In a similar vein, both parties installed ‘watchdog’ 
junior ministers to oversee departments headed by their partner.  However, this shadowing was 
incomplete, and several important departments controlled by the Conservatives lacked a Liberal 
Democrat junior minister, including the Department for Environment Food, and Rural Affairs (2010-
12), the Department for International Development (2010-12) and the Foreign Office (2012-15). 
 
*** Table 2 here *** 
 
Finally, to resolve disputes, a number of bodies were established.  The main formal arena was the 
Coalition Committee, an official cabinet committee with terms of reference to ‘manage the business 
and priorities of the Government and the implementation and operation of the Coalition agreement.’  
This chaired by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, and had equal (not proportional) 
representation from both parties.  A smaller ‘informal working sub-group’, the Coalition Operation 
and Strategic Planning Group, was also established with a remit to ‘consider and resolve issues relating 
to the operation of the coalition agreement, the longer-term strategic planning of government 
business and to report as necessary to the Coalition Committee.’  Together, these two bodies were 
intended to provide a two-stage conflict resolution process.  The Coalition Operation and Strategic 
Planning Group was envisaged as an intermediate arena where most coalition matters would be dealt 
with; and the Coalition Committee was envisaged to be the final arbiter for any unresolved issues (for 
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an overview, see Hazell, 2012). In addition to these two formal bodies, an informal ‘inner-cabinet’ 
quickly emerged, which became known as ‘the Quad’ and comprised four key ministers from the two 
parties; Cameron, George Osborne, Clegg and Danny Alexander. 
  
 
The formal architecture of coalition governance detailed above was comprehensive, encompassing all 
of the ex-ante and ex-post tools detailed in the preceding section.  Evidence suggests that this formal 
machinery assumed an important frontstage role in terms of ‘setting the scene’, providing a series of 
signals and cues to a number of different audiences about how the Coalition would operate.  Of 
particular significance was the Programme for Government coalition agreement.  Several interviewees 
spoke of how its publication served to bind the two parties to their shared endeavour, particularly at 
the outset.  One Conservative cabinet minister described this ‘blueprint’ as a ‘fairly comprehensive 
document with no room for squabbles’ (interview with author); and another minister praised the 
coalition agreement for making explicit the ‘huge compromises’ between the two parties, which 
meant that ‘we were all going into this with eyes wide open’ (interview with author).  Moreover, for 
the Liberal Democrats, so long out of power, the agreement was a source of optimism, as reflected in 
David Laws’ account of ‘jubilant’ MPs who were ‘delighted by just how much of our manifesto we had 
managed to negotiate into the document’ (Laws, 2016a: 18).  Interviewees also reflected on the role 
of the Programme for Government in coalescing the wider party around this shared set of policy 
objectives.  The internal democracy of the Liberal Democrats meant that the agreement received the 
active endorsement of its members, and a number of specific provisions were identified as providing 
important assurances to those who had expressed reservations about the prospect of power-sharing 
with the Conservatives (see Laws, 2016a: 10-18). In contrast, several Conservative backbenchers 
expressed serious concerns about their lack of consultation.  One stated that ‘there was absolutely no 
deliberation.  It felt as though you were being hit by an oncoming train’ (interview with author), and 




Later into the Coalition’s time in office, the agreement also assumed prominence at moments of ‘high 
drama’, when public recourse was made to its provisions.  This was vividly illustrated during 2012 
when, in response to the collapse of Conservative support for the House of Lords Reform Bill, the 
Liberal Democrats withdrew their support for constituency boundary reforms.  Whilst both policies 
appeared in the Programme for Government, they were unrelated.  Nonetheless, this apparent 
infidelity to the agreement was used to justify inter-party dissent, as the Deputy Prime Minister 
deplored the Conservatives’ ‘pick and choose’ attitude towards political reform and their failure to 
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‘honour’ the ‘contract’ (BBC, 2012).  The agreement also featured in critical negotiations between the 
Coalition’s leaders, and was often invoked in private to head-off potentially damaging inter-party 
disputes by ensuring a united front on politically contentious policy commitments such as NHS reforms 
and public sector cuts (see Clegg, 2016; Laws, 2016a).  As this suggests, by setting the broad policy 
agenda and providing a channel of overarching accountability, the Programme for Government 
operated as an important, often symbolic, backstop.  In terms of the day-to-day operation of the 
Coalition, however, it assumed less significance.  As one senior civil servant explained, whilst the 
Programme for Government ‘provide[d] a bit of discipline in terms of prioritisation’, it was not ‘in any 
way the main focus of government activity’ (interview with author).   
 
Establishing informal governance arrangements 
 
Instead, it was the less visible backstage that was of critical importance in terms of making policy, 
managing tensions and mitigating the impact of frontstage drama.  Here, formal party labels mattered 
less, and effective informal governance was often the product of shared political values and norms, a 
common sense of endeavour, and personal amity and accord.  In terms of shared political values and 
norms, the overlap between the two parties was much greater than should be anticipated from a 
coalition comprised of supposed ‘arch enemies’ (Laws, 2016a: 559).  Having had no previous 
experience of working together, several interviewees were surprised at how much alignment existed 
between the two parties.  As one Conservative cabinet minister recalled: 
 
A Liberal Democrat minister… turned to me and said ‘we had no idea that you lot were so 
liberal’.  I replied, saying we had no idea they were so conservative… [W]e were quite surprised 
by how close we stood together on issues (interview with author).  
 
Of course, this overlap was not complete, and there remained clear differences between the parties 
on a range of issues.  Nonetheless, the existence of such differences was frequently cited as a positive 
force in terms of robust policymaking.  As Conservative minister Stephen Crabb explained, this ‘party 
political tension [was] on the whole a good thing’ because ‘it meant that issues and policies had to 
fought over a bit harder… [and] thought through a bit more’ (Crabb, 2016). 
 
 
At the same time, the two parties found common political ground in their opposition to the previous 
Labour government.  As David Laws made clear, ‘much of our agenda could be defined against the 
previous Labour government’, and there was a ‘distinct sense of overarching mission – to clear up the 
economic mess we inherited from the previous administration’ (Laws, 2016a: 560).   Such a common 
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sense of endeavor was particularly evident within departments, and several interviewees spoke of 
how a shared departmental mission fostered an esprit de corps.  Reflecting on the painful process of 
welfare reform, Liberal Democrat Minister for Pensions Steven Webb said ‘all the ministers sat round 
the table with the list of horrible things to do… And that bonded us… in a bizarre kind of way’ (Webb, 
2015).   This was reiterated by his Secretary of State, Iain Duncan Smith, who described how they 
became ‘very good friends [with] a high degree of trust between us.  We didn’t have any problems 
about sorting out different coalition priorities’ (Duncan Smith, 2016).  The importance of trust was 
reiterated by several other ministers.  ‘Over time trusts builds up’, one Conservative minister 
explained, and ‘[w]e discovered that actually governing together was easier than we thought it was 
going to be and quite effective’ (interview with author).   
 
 
It was therefore unsurprising that ‘a lot of personal friendships sprang up’ (cabinet minister, interview 
with author), and several interviewees reflected on how personal amity and accord was a vital channel 
of informal governance.  In many instances, personal connections pre-dated the Coalition.  One 
Conservative minister, for example, recalled how an earlier school-gate acquaintance with a Liberal 
Democrat colleague contributed to effective cross-departmental working; and another recalled how 
their existing friendship with the spouse of one of their coalition colleagues provided a common bond 
during their time in government together (interviews with author).  The significance of such amity 
cannot be overstated.  David Laws, for example, recalled how the senior members of the coalition – 
Cameron, Clegg, Osbourne, Alexander, Letwin and Laws – ‘all got on very well’, thus avoiding ‘the type 
of personal animosity which would otherwise have undermined the government’ (Laws, 2016a: 560).   
In particular, the shared background, age and social outlook of the Prime Minister and his Deputy was 
widely regarded as vital in cementing the Coalition.  As one Labour backbencher drily observed, ‘Clegg 
was also socially comfortable with Cameron. Both public school boys, both the same height, same 
good looks, same haircut. A very easy Rose Garden love-in for them’ (interview with author).  
Moreover, whilst Nick Clegg’s subsequent memoirs (2016) were often highly critical of his erstwhile 
colleague, David Laws credited the two with ‘establishing and maintaining [a] friendly atmosphere, 
which lasted right through to the end’ (Laws, 2016a: 560).   
 
 
Of course, not all coalition relationships were as harmonious as those described above, as revealed in 
the memoirs of several coalition members (Clarke, 2016; Clegg, 2016; Laws, 2016a).  However, there 
is little evidence to suggest that such discord was solely the product of partisan differences, and as 
one senior Conservative minister made clear, ‘the divisions in government are by no means always on 
party lines’ (interview with author).  Nonetheless, despite the importance of these channels of 
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informal governance, the backstage management of the Coalition was subject to a number of 
frontstage pressures, in particular the challenge of reconciling competing loyalties, the management 
of the wider parliamentary party, the desire to differentiate, and the pressure of prospective elections.  
More broadly, the day-to-day practice of coalition was beset by a number of institutional limitations 
and incongruencies as, despite the raft of initiatives detailed above, the Whitehall machine did not 
readily adapt to the demands of multi-party government.  
 
 
Navigating the dilemmas of coalition governance 
 
As discussed above, coalition partners typically appoint ‘watchdog’ ministers to guard their party’s 
interests.  In office, however, ministers are required to reconcile competing loyalties – to the party, to 
the government, and to their department – and several interviewees reflected on the tensions in 
which this resulted:   
 
I would be getting some mood music out of Nick Clegg’s office that this was all far too 
collegiate and cooperative when they wanted more grit in the oyster.  I think well I can’t just 
be grit in the oyster because I’m also a minister in the Government having ministerial team 
meetings with the Home Secretary. And I can’t behave like I’m an opposition MP, I’m a 
government minister (Browne, 2015). 
 
But my view was if you were the Minister of State, with a Conservative Secretary of State… 
then you were the Lib Dem minister for that department. I know they allocate responsibilities 
within the department, but you were also the Lib Dem minister that should be looking at other 
things in that department that weren’t necessarily your primary responsibility (Wallace, 2015, 
emphasis added). 
 
Other interviewees suggested that the demands of departmental business resulted in ‘surprisingly 
little contact with other ministers’ from their own party (Laws, 2016b), as ‘the departments did tend 
to cocoon you’ (McNally, 2015).  Such tensions were further exacerbated by the way that Nick Clegg 
utilised the Liberal Democrat’s share of appointments, where a conscious trade-off was made 
between depth and breadth.  Several ministers reflected on the sense of isolation in which this 
strategy resulted.  In the Department for Transport, for example, Baroness Kramer explained how ‘as 
a Liberal Democrat, I was quite isolated and I would think “if only we were all Liberal Democrats in 




At the same time, the management of the wider parliamentary party was often fraught.  As described 
above, many Conservative MPs felt ‘bounced’ into the Coalition, which resulted in animosity between 
the front and back benches.  Indeed, one senior backbencher suggested that ‘the tribal loyalty 
between the Conservative backbenchers and the government is diluted [as] you start from the 
premise that “this isn’t my administration, it’s a coalition”’ (interview with author).  Moreover, there 
existed a degree of enmity between the two parties’ backbenchers.  As one senior backbencher put 
it, ‘there was a sort of barmy post-marital jolly period… but we have reverted to normal hostilities’ 
(interview with author).  The loosening of party loyalty was evidenced by the fact that the 2010-15 
parliament was the most rebellious of the post-war period; and despite provisions for the application 
of the whip on all Programme for Government pledges, Coalition MPs rebelled in 35 percent of all 
divisions (Cowley, 2015).  Indeed, one cabinet minister suggested that their party’s backbenchers 
‘tend to angrily blame the Liberal Democrats as an excuse for voting against the government’ 
(interview with author).  Yet despite their prevalence, rebellions were rarely in concert, and 
government defeats were relatively infrequent.  Reflecting on this, several interviewees suggested 
that a degree of rebellion had been permitted as a means of managing intra- and inter-party tensions.  
Indeed, some interviewees speculated that these rebellions were stage-managed by the whips.  
‘They’re taking it in turns’, suggested one Labour backbencher, ‘there’s a clear policy of “you’re 
allowed to rebel this week so that you can go back to your constituency and say you don’t agree with 
this or that”’ (interview with author).   
 
 
Frustrations were further compounded by a number of institutional limitations and incongruencies, as 
the Whitehall machine remained unaligned to the exigencies of coalition.  As Conservative minister 
David Willets drily observed, ‘the machine found it hard to handle coalition, especially at first’ 
(Willetts, 2015).  Several junior Liberal Democrat ministers drew attention to the asymmetry of 
resources and support, such as that offered by special advisers.  Despite the existence of two distinct 
parties within government, the rules regulating their appointment within the Ministerial Code were 
unchanged, which allowed cabinet ministers to appoint a maximum of two advisers, and for ministers 
attending cabinet to appoint one (Cabinet Office, 2010: 6).  This had clear consequences for the Liberal 
Democrats’ policy capacity: 
 
I depended a lot on my spad [special adviser]. But again, I only had a small part of his time. He 
was a very good spad, but one that worked across several departments, whereas the 
Conservatives had, I think, three spads totally focused on transport and on getting a much 
more Conservative-biased transport agenda established (Kramer, 2016). 
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In a similar vein, Nick Clegg was irritated to discover that ‘[w]hile the 200 or so staff in Downing Street 
leapt into action to support the new Prime Minister, I was given just a single civil servant’, which left 
the Deputy Prime Minister ‘trying to do my job at one end of the coalition see-saw with a tiny fraction 
of the support provided at the other’.  It was ‘embarrassingly clear’, he concluded, that the civil service 
‘had no idea how to serve a coalition government… and there was no substantive thinking… as to how 
it might effectively become so’ (Clegg, 2016: 53-4).  Indeed, Clegg’s memoirs suggest that this 
institutional asymmetry, along with Number 10’s determination to protect ‘Cameron’s image as the 
government’s commander-in-chief’ (Clegg, 2016: 94), was significant in the souring of his relationship 
with the Prime Minister, as he became increasingly frustrated with his inability to assert himself as co-
author of the Coalition. 
 
 
There was also evidence to suggest that cabinet and its committees lacked the capacity to facilitate 
cross-party discussion and collective decision-making.  Whitehall observers have long lamented the 
superficiality of cabinet discussions, and under the Coalition there was little evidence to suggest its 
revival.  Indeed, one cabinet minister described its meetings as a ‘very odd setting’ where ‘business is 
contrived to avoid any possibility of anyone debating what is actually the biggest political issue of the 
day’ (interview with author).  A number of interviewees were also critical of how several committees 
run by their respective chairs.  One Conservative minister described the cabinet committees as ‘very 
poor.  Nick Clegg ran all of ours and he took too much on.  He couldn’t cope with the workload.  Easy 
decisions were taking weeks’ (Djanogly, 2015).  Another suggested that some committees had been 
willfully neglected as a means of quashing inter-party tensions:  
 
it becomes clear very early on [that] the Economic Affairs Cabinet Committee is not meeting 
and is not a functioning committee…. George [Osborne] didn’t want to have Vince [Cable] 
coming in regularly and speaking across the whole range of domestic and economic policy 
(Willetts, 2015). 
 
It should be noted that not all interviewees shared this pessimism.  Oliver Letwin, for example, 
regarded cabinet committees as ‘very, very useful things because you could have the formal debates 
and you could also have informal discussions outside them and then they’d crystallise in the formal 
debates’.  Moreover, by suggesting that ‘the committee structure combined with the Programme for 
Government did provide a framework within which those detailed and ad hoc discussions could always 
be set’, Letwin ascribed to the committee system an important role in the meta-governance of the 




Nonetheless, most interviewees acknowledged that the formal machinery established to manage 
coalition disputes had been superseded by informal arrangements.  In particular, the Quad quickly 
assumed prominence as ‘the real engine-room of decision-making’ (Clegg, 2016: 79).  In this important 
backstage venue, ‘meetings were always open and frank… and were largely conducted in good faith 
and remained constructive long after coalition cooperation in other departments had broken down’ 
(Clegg, 2016: 79).  This led to accusations that the Quad had undermined collective decision-making.  
One senior Conservative minister suggested that ‘far too many things go to the Quad’, which had 
become an ‘unhealthy’ substitute for formal cabinet discussion (interview with author).   
 
 
Yet precisely because so many issues were resolved informally and in private, the Liberal Democrats 
were concerned that ‘no-one knew about’ their ‘positive impact on policies’ (Laws, 2016a: 123).  
Unsurprisingly a tension emerged between the competing demands of ensuring intra-government 
cohesion whilst maintaining inter-party individuality, the so-called ‘unity-distinctiveness dilemma’ 
(Boston and Bullock, 2009).  This desire to differentiate was most apparent during party conference 
season, when the leaders of each party sought to appease the party faithful and reach out to the wider 
electorate with eye-catching policy announcements and claims to coalition successes.  Yet whilst such 
set-pieces were played out for the benefit of these frontstage audiences, evidence suggests that 
behind the scenes, these events were carefully stage-managed: 
 
Each year during the coalition, we would discuss for some weeks the policy announcements 
that each party wanted to make at its conference…  Each party would draw up its list of policy 
priorities in private… and we would then compare lists to see if agreements could be made… 
[T]he two lists [would] then go to a political Quad to seek agreement (Laws, 2016a: 202). 
 
Nonetheless, whilst the Quad was intended as a clearing house for such policy announcements, it is 
evident that frontstage considerations often prevailed, as illustrated by David Cameron’s continued 
willingness to claim credit for policies that owed their existence to the Liberal Democrats.  This 
included the latter’s flagship policy of raising the income tax threshold, which Cameron presented to 
the party membership as an implied Conservative success: ‘We’ve given real help to the poorest and 





There was also a significant temporal dimension to the widening of the gap between private backstage 
discussion and public frontstage performance, which was driven by the pressure of prospective 
elections.  As anticipated by the ‘unity-distinctiveness’ dilemma, the approach of the 2015 general 
election witnessed each party distancing itself from its coalition partner, and at times outright 
disparagement prevailed, particularly on the part of the Liberal Democrats: 
 
Cows moo. Dogs bark. And Tories cut. It’s in their DNA… They’re not even pretending they 
want us to be ‘all in this together’ any more.  The Conservative plan for the next government 
is an ideological lurch to the right.  They have gone from being the self-proclaimed heirs to 
Blair to Nigel Farage in white tie (Clegg, 2015). 
 
Nick Clegg’s memoirs paint a vivid picture of his increasing frustration with the Conservatives, who he 
came to regard as ‘the intellectual magpies of British politics – brilliant at picking up anything that 
shimmers and shines, shamelessly pinching other people’s prized possessions for their own purposes’ 
(Clegg, 2016: 38).  Indeed, the way in which David Cameron announced in 2014 that ‘that a future 
Conservative Government will raise the tax-free personal allowance from £10,500 to £12,500’ 
(Cameron, 2014) can be regarded as evidence of this supposed kleptomania. 
 
 
Overall, therefore, the day-to-day governance of the coalition was increasingly challenging as the 
parliament progressed.  Indeed, the Coalition endgame was widely regarded as the most ineffective 
period of government.  Vince Cable, for example, described the last few months of government as 
‘quite ragged and frustrating… all we did was scrap the whole time… [having] endless, endless fights 
over who gets the credit for things’ (Cable, 2015).  Within departments, a de facto purdah commenced 
several months before the election was formally announced (senior civil servant, interview with 
author); and there was a wide sense that the Coalition had ‘run out of steam’ (Conservative 
backbencher, interview with author) and ‘run out of things to agree on’ (Labour frontbencher, 
interview with author).  A number of Liberal Democrats also expressed their exasperation at the 
Conservatives’ seeming shift to the right, with David Laws remarking that the supposedly 
‘“compassionate Conservative’ agenda did for survive for long once in government’ (Laws, 2016a, p. 
560).  However, it is possible to construct an alternative reading of this growing frustration, which 
draws attention to the Liberal Democrats’ transition from the edges of opposition to the heart of 
government, and the extent to which optimism and principled purity were confronted by realism and 
political pragmatism.  Several interviewees commented on the challenge of reconciling these tensions, 
with one suggesting that ‘we never resolved whether we wanted to be a governing party or whether 





This article has sought to explain the everyday practice of coalition governance, as experienced by the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition between 2010-15.  The inconclusive general election result 
of 2010 provided an important opportunity to experiment with a form of politics largely untested at 
the national level, where the norms of adversarial majoritarianism prevailed.  As this article has 
shown, this resulted in the creation of a series of formal mechanisms to accommodate the exigencies 
of power-sharing within an institutional framework more attuned to the demands of single party 
majorities.  In some respects, these institutional innovations were typical of the broad trends in 
coalition governance identified in comparative scholarship (Müller and Strøm, 2003b).  However, 
whereas many countries in western Europe have extensive experience of coalition cabinets, and have 
gradually adapted their institutional terrain over several decades, the substantial programme of 
measures implemented in the UK was marked by its rapidity.  The speed by which these changes were 
instigated reflects the majoritarian structures of the British polity, in particular the capacity for 
institutional innovation afforded by a constitution with few formal veto-points.  Nonetheless, despite 
the seeming incongruence of consensual power-sharing within a polity steeped in majoritarian 
tradition and norms, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition proved comparatively durable and 
lasted for the full five-year term specified by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011.   
 
 
However, whilst this machinery provided a series of formal ground rules that structured the inter-
election period, this article has shown how coalition governance often proceeded through informal 
channels, and rested on shared political values and norms, a common sense of endeavour, and a 
degree of personal amity and accord.  At the same time, the article has also revealed how the 
backstage practice of the coalition was often challenged by a number of frontstage pressures, as 
coalition actors were required to reconcile a number of competing loyalties (party, government, 
department) and appease a wide range of audiences (backbenchers, activists, voters).  Indeed, this 
article demonstrates that whilst the ‘backstage’ of coalition provided the space for actors to ‘relax 
from their roles, step out of character and work with their dramaturgical teammates to prepare for 
the front stage performance’ (Freidman, 1995: 93), accommodation and compromise was often 
‘bounded’, occurring within the shadow of prevailing institutional norms. The article has also 
underlined the extent that coalition governance was subject to important temporal dynamics, as the 
optimism surrounding the birth of the coalition gave way to the reality of coalition life, and the 




More broadly, this article points to an important new avenue of research, which moves away from 
large-n comparative research and towards detailed case analyses that treat coalition actors as 
situated, contingent, and contextually-bound.  By specifying the different dimensions of formal and 
informal coalition governance, and the different frontstage and backstage arenas in which these 
transactions occur, this article provides a useful and transferrable analytical framework to capture the 
multi-dimensionality of coalition governance.  In turn, by identifying the key challenges that exist in 
terms of frontstage pressures and institutional limitations, this article directs attention to the way in 
which coalition actors navigate the demands of multiparty politics, manage the multiple roles that 
they must occupy, and respond to the dilemmas to which these challenges give rise.  At the same 
time, there are a number of specific issues that warrant further investigation.  The case analysed in 
this article focuses on a system of government ill-suited to the demands of coalition, and on two 
parties unused to governing together.  A question mark therefore hangs over the extent to which 
previous experience generally (whether a party has experience of coalition) and specifically (whether 
the parties have experience of working together) affects the interplay between the formal and 
informal dimensions of coalition governance.  Such research is undoubtedly warranted.  Existing 
scholarship has furnished us with a great deal of knowledge regarding the birth and death of 
coalitions, and by taking this agenda forwards, the net result will be an accumulation of knowledge 
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1. Questions and coding derived from Müller and Strøm, 2003: 20-1. 
2.  Aggregate of 238 observations across 13 cases (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden).  Data derived from Muller and Strom, 2003: 574.  
Dimensions of coalition 
governance1 
 
Western Europe, 1945-20002 
 
UK, 2010-15 
1. Is there a coalition agreement? Yes – 63% 




Comprises two documents: The Coalition: Our 
programme for government [policy] and Coalition 
Agreement for Stability and Reform [governing 
processes]. 
2. Is the coalition agreement 
intended to be public during the 
lifetime of the coalition? 
 
Yes – 52%  
No – 48%  
Yes 
 
Both documents were made public. There was also 
a mid-term review in 2013, The Coalition: together 
in the national interest. 
3. Is the coalition based on an 
‘election rule’, automatically 
leading to elections in the event 
of a breakdown? 
 
Yes – 18% 
No – 82% 
No 
 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2012 was 
introduced as a bulwark against early dissolution. 
4. Are there specifically designed 
conflict management 
mechanisms between the 
parties? 
 
Inner cabinet – 8/13 cases 
Cabinet committee(s) – 9/13 cases 
Coalition committee – 7/13 cases 
Parliamentary leaders – 3/13 cases 
Ministers and parliamentarians – 4/13 
cases 





The Coalition Committee was established to oversee 
its operation and to handle unresolved issues, but 
was rarely used.  The informal inner-cabinet – 
known as the ‘Quad’ – of Cameron, Osborne, Clegg 
and Alexander met regularly. 
5. Is the coalition based on the 
understanding that there will be 
coalition discipline in 
parliamentary votes on 
legislation? 
 
Yes, on all policies except those 
explicitly exempted. 
[Modal average across all 13 cases.] 
Yes, on all policies except those explicitly exempted. 
 
Collective responsibility set aside in relation to five 
policy issues within Our programme for 
government, and the Ministerial Code was revised 
to accommodate this. Coalition Agreement details 
expectations regarding parliamentary support for 
government business. 
6. Is the coalition based on the 
understanding that there will be 
coalition discipline in other 
parliamentary behaviour?  
Yes, on all matters except those 
explicitly exempted.  
[Modal average across all 13 cases.] 
No 
 
Coalition Agreement focuses on support for 
government business only. 
7. Do the coalition parties have 
freedom of appointment for the 
ministerial posts allocated to 
them? 
Yes – 81% 
No – 19%  
Yes  
 
Appointments allocated in proportion to the size of 
the parliamentary parties.  
8. Is the coalition based on a 
substantial and explicit policy 
platform?  
 
On a variety of issues but not 
comprehensive 
OR 
Comprehensive policy platform  
[Tied modal average across all 13 
cases]. 
Comprehensive policy platform 
 
Our programme for government contained over 400 
separate pledges, of varying degrees of specificity, 
across 31 policy areas. 
9. Do the coalition parties agree 
on the distribution of junior 
ministers? 
 
Yes – 78% 
No - 22% 
Yes 
 
Distribution of all government positions agreed by 
the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 
10. Do the coalition parties agree 
on the distribution of non-cabinet 
positions? 
Yes – 76% 
No – 24% 
No 
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Table 2: Distribution of ministerial positions, 2010-15 







July 2014  
reshuffle 
Seat contribution to coalition  
 
Con – 84.3% 
LD – 16.7% 
Con – 84.3% 
LD – 16.7% 
Con – 84.4% 
LD – 16.6% 
Con – 84.4% 
LD – 16.6% 
Share of cabinet positions 
 
Con – 78.3% 
LD – 21.7% 
Con – 77.3% 
LD – 22.8% 
Con – 78.3% 
LD – 21.7% 
Con – 77.3% 
LD – 22.7% 
Share of all ministerial 
positions 
 
Con – 80.7% 
LD – 19.3% 
Con – 78.5% 
LD – 21.5% 
Con – 79.3% 
LD – 20.7% 
Con – 79.7% 
LD – 20.3% 
Departments shadowed a 
junior ‘watchdog’ ministers 1. 
 
LD shadow 10/15 
Con shadow 4/4 
LD shadow 12/15 
Con shadow 4/4 
LD shadow 12/15 
Con shadow 4/4 
LD shadow 11/15 
Con shadow 4/4 
1.  This encompasses only those departments headed by a Secretary of State and HM Treasury. 
 
